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DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE, AF A/S FRAZER
AND AF/SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

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SUBJECT: CDA HUME URGES CHANGE IN SUDANESE POSITION ON
PEACE-KEEPING IN DARFUR

Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Previewing the forthcoming visit of Deputy
Secretary Negroponte with Presidential Advisor Ismael, CDA

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Hume said that Secretary Rice was sending Negroponte to Sudan
because of her concern about the overall outlook for
U.S.-Sudanese relations. Secretary Rice was concerned about
the lack of progress on Darfur and the future of the
relationship. In particular, the United States is concerned
about the apparent rejection of the agreements reached in
November in Addis and Abuja. This rejection was plainly
evident in the text of the letter from President Bashir to UN
Secretary General Ban. The Tripartite meeting in Addis April

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9 represented an opportunity for the Sudanese to set the
record straight. End summary.

12. (C) CDA Hume, at his request, met with Presidential
Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismael on April 7 to preview the April
12-16 visit of Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte.
Secretary Rice questioned whether or not the United States

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could continue to work with this government in light of the
lack of progress in Darfur, especially the backsliding on the
part of the Sudanese from their agreements in Addis and
Abuja. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is three
months behind in paying its soldiers and nearing collapse.
The united position of the international community, including
China and Russia, is that UN command and control was
essential for there to be UN financing of the peace-keeping
mission. Without UN financing, the mission would fail.
However, President Bashir's position, spelled out in his
speech of April 2, was inconsistent with this possibility.
The Tripartite meeting in Addis April 9 represented an
opportunity for the Sudanese to rectify their position and
accept the UN/AU plan as proposed.

13. (C) Ismael rejected the assertion that the Sudanese were
retreating from their commitments in Addis and Abuja, stating
that only minor items remained to be negotiated. If these
could not be resolved at the Tripartite meeting on April 9,
perhaps the U.S. and Sudanese could work out their
differences between them. If not, the AU Peace and Security
Council would have to re-examine the situation. Ismael
agreed there was no time to waste. There was a widening
divide between the U.S. and Sudan, and it was imperative that
both sides work together to reduce tensions.

¶4. (C) Ismael said that the international community and Sudan are in agreement on the humanitarian and political components of the situation in Darfur. Only the peace-keeping element remained to be worked out. With respect to the March 28 meeting between President Bashir and Secretary General Ban at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Ismael said that it was apparent that the Secretary General was not in command of all the details of the Darfur situation. As a result, Ismael had to urge President Bashir go easy on him. Regardless, President Bashir had told Secretary General Ban that he accepted the Addis and Abuja agreements.

¶5. (C) Ismael urged that USG concerns regarding command and control could be satisfied by working through the jointly appointed AU/UN Force Commander, and he asserted that, if not enough African troops were available for the force, then Sudan would accept troops from elsewhere. He said the government in Khartoum gave more importance to talks on these issues with the USG than with the UN.

¶6. (C) Comment: The visit of the Deputy Secretary offers the best opportunity to impress upon the Sudanese that peace-keeping forces in Darfur must operate under the full command and control of the United Nations in order to secure UN financing. End comment.
HUME